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COMMENTS
ANTITRUST LIABILITY FOR BAD FAITH ASSERTION
OF TRADE SECRETS
I.

INTRODUCTION

A trade secret is confidential business information, not known by
others, that gives the owner an advantage over competitors who do not
know or use the information.' The owner of a trade secret may sue to
enjoin unlawful dissemination of the trade secret for a limited time and
may recover damages for its unlawful "misappropriation." 2 Although a
trade secret may be misappropriated by theft, industrial espionage or intrusive surveillance, the most common misappropriation occurs when an
employee who had access to the information resigns and either joins a
rival competitor or forms a new firm to compete with the former employer. Although an employer may have a justified interest in litigating
to protect its trade secrets in either circumstance, the actual use or threat
of litigation may be manipulated by predatory employers who, with
knowledge that no trade secrets exist, assert trade secrets in bad faith in
order to restrain competition or monopolize a market. 3
For the established competitor, the threat of litigation is a recog1. See infra notes 12-32 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. A trade secret misappropriation must
be distinguished from the general misappropriation theory of unfair competition
recognized in International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
The latter claim has generally been held preempted under section 301 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). See, e.g., Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833
F.2d 117, 121 (8th Cir. 1987); Del Madera Properties v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc.,
820 F.2d 973, 977 (9th Cir. 1987); Ehat v. Tanner, 780 F.2d 876, 878 (lOth Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 820 (1986). But see Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's
Investors Serv., 808 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting in dicta, based on legislative history, that INS claims are not preempted), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987).
Conversely, trade secret misappropriation claims are not generally preempted
under the copyright laws because they do not confer "equivalent rights" to those
granted to copyright holders, and require different elements of proof. See Southern
Mississippi Planning & Dev. Dist., Inc. v. Robertson, 660 F. Supp. 1057, 1061 (S.D.
Miss. 1986); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 763 (E.D. La.
1987), a.ff'd, 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988); Brignoli v. Balch Hardy & Scheinmann,
Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1201, 1204-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see also H.R. REP. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132, 1976 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5748;
Reece, Trade Secret Misappropriation: A Review and Analysis of Massachusetts Law,
71 MAss. L. REV. 171, 172-73 (1986). But see Avco Corp. v. Precision Air Parts,
Inc., 210 U.S.P.Q. 894, 897-98 (M.D. Ala. 1980) (holding in dicta that a claim based
on common law trade secret is preempted unless breach of confidentiality is an element of the action), a.ff'd on other grounds, 676 F.2d 494 (11th Cir.) (affirmed on
limitations grounds only), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1037 (1982). This comment uses
the term misappropriation only in connection with unlawful use of trade secrets.
3. A claim against an employer for a bad faith assertion of a trade secret may be
brought under the Sherman Act, section 1 or 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ I, 2 (1982), or an
equivalent state act. See CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842 (lst Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986) (federal); Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 108
Wash. 2d 38, 738 P.2d 665 (1987) (state).
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nized economic risk associated with acquiring the employee. 4 For the
fledgling business, in contrast, defense of possibly unanticipated
threatened or actual trade secret litigation can mean financial disaster. 5
In either case, if the suit brought by the former employer is resolved in
favor of the former employee, the employee's new firm may recover damages in limited circumstances.
Under the general rule in the United States, if a case is brought negligently but the claimant is acting in good faith, both parties are responsible for their own attorneys fees. 6 On the other hand, if the case is
brought in technical bad faith, 7 the prevailing party may recover all or
some of its attorneys fees. 8 Finally, if the case is brought in actual bad
faith, 9 the former employer may be liable not only for attorneys fees, but
4. See generally Kolowrat & Staton, Dramatization: Restraints on Technology Access,
49 ANTITRUST L.J. 429 (1980) (hypothetical dialogue between counsel and management after former employer threatens to sue). The probability of a trade secret suit,
the former employer's likelihood of success, the magnitude of harm to the competitor if the suit is successful, the cost of hiring the employee away, and the potential
value the employee would add to the firm are relevant considerations when deciding
whether to hire the employee.
5. See Smith, Eliminating Predatory Litigation in the Context of Baseless Trade Secret
Claims: The Need for a More Aggressive Counterattack, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
1095, 1099-1101 (1983).
6. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); Hall
v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4 (1973); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,
386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967); Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of America, Inc., 850 F.2d
1373, 1384 (lOth Cir. 1988) ("not even objectively frivolous claims advanced in subjective good faith justify [attorney] fee awards .... "). This is not a zero sum game;
both the former employer and the competitor have paid attorneys for litigation that
has not benefitted either party.
7. Technical bad faith is the subjective intent of the party bringing the case to assert
valid legal rights for some unlawful purpose. See In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 445
(7th Cir. 1983); Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 470-73
(7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983); cf Roadway Express, Inc. v.
Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980) (analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982)); see also infra
notes 81-86, 128-30 and accompanying text.
8. The decision to award attorneys fees in such a situation rests in the discretion of the
trial judge. See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 258-59; Hall, 412 U.S. at 5, 15; 28
U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) (liability for vexatiously multiplying proceedings); FED. R.
CIV. P. 11 (liability for improper investigation of merits of pleadings filed in federal
district court); FED. R. C1v. P. 41(d) (costs after previous dismissal of action); FED.
R. APP. P. 38 (authority for the courts of appeals to award damages for filing frivolous appeals); see also Cady, Curbing Litigation Abuse and Misuse: A Judicial Approach, 36 DRAKE L. REV. 483, 489-507 (1987).
9. Actual bad faith is the subjective intent to accomplish an unlawful objective coupled
with actual subjective knowledge that there was no legal basis on which to assert the
claim. See CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 851 (1st Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd.,
797 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986). Some courts allow
antitrust liability to attach where improper motive to monopolize a market or restrain trade is present, regardless of the validity of the underlying claim. See, e.g.,
In re Burlington Northern, Inc., 822 F.2d 518, 527-29 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1007 (1988); Winterlands Concession Co. v. Trela, 735 F.2d 257, 263-64
(7th Cir. 1984); Grip-Pak, 694 F.2d at 473; see also infra notes 81-86 and accompa-
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also under state and federal antitrust laws if the other elements of an
antitrust violation are present.
This comment discusses the latter type of bad faith in the context of
employer assertions of trade secrets. 10 First, the elements of a valid trade
secret are examined, and compared to other forms of intellectual property rights to highlight the nature and characteristics of trade secret
property. Next, antitrust liability for "patent fraud" and related theories
are discussed as they pertain to the development of a cause of action for
bad faith assertion of trade secrets. The holding of CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon 11 is then explored, including a brief discussion of other antitrust
elements and significant limitations on the cause of action. Finally, other
formulations of bad faith are discussed and practical considerations are
reviewed in light of the cause of action for bad faith assertion of trade
·
secrets.
II.

TRADE SECRETS, PATENTS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP

A.

Elements of a Trade Secret

American courts have overwhelmingly adopted the Restatement of
Torts definition of a trade secret: 12
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or
nying text. This latter type of antitrust liability, however, is circumscribed by the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See infra notes 120-30 and accompanying text.
10. This comment does not address employer assertions of antitrust violations, see, e.g.,
Kolowrat, Stack & Lynch, Restraints on Technology Access: Protection of Trade
Secrets and Confidential Information, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 735, 750 (1980); Yoerg,
Should a Trade Secret Misappropriation Claim Lie in the Procrustean Antitrust Bed?,
22 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1977); other substantive claims such as abuse of process,
interference with economic relations, trade defamation, interference with contractual relations, interference with prospective economic advantage and malicious
prosecution, see Smith, supra note 5, at 1105-08; procedural defenses, see Smith,
supra note 5, at 1105-21; bad faith assertions of other types of intellectual property
(patents, trademarks and copyrights), see generally Kolowrat, Stack & Lynch,
supra, at 735-49; or misappropriation of customer lists, see, e.g., Annotation, Former
Employee's Duty, In Absence of Express Contract, Not to Solicit Former Employer's
Customers or Otherwise Use His Knowledge of Customer Lists Acquired in Earlier
Employment, 28 A.L.R.3D 7 (1969).
11. 769 F.2d 842 (lst Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
12. The following jurisdictions have adopted or referred to the Restatement of Torts
section 757 comment b definition of a trade secret: Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia and Wisconsin. See 12 R. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 2.01, at 2-3 to -9 n.2 (1967 & Supp. 1989). Several
jurisdictions have also adopted a uniform law with a substantially similar definition.
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT§ 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 372 (Supp. 1989) (24 jurisdictions, including some listed above, have adopted the uniform law in various forms).
For an extensive discussion on the subject of what constitutes a trade secret, see
Annotation, What is "Trade Secret" so as to render actionable under State law its use
or disclosure by former employee, 59 A.L.R.4TH 641 (1988).
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compilation of information which is used in one's business, and
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it. 13
The breadth of this definition is sufficient to encompass almost any innovative technology developed by a business. Consequently, when deciding
whether a trade secret exists, courts have focused on one or more elements of a trade secret, 14 or on the nature of the employee's conduct. 15
Specifically, courts will determine: (1) whether the formula, pattern or
device is the proper subject of trade secret protection; (2) whether the
formula, pattern or device is maintained in reasonable secrecy and confidence; (3) whether there is a misappropriation; and (4) if there is a misappropriation, whether the parties had an agreement that provides a
remedy.
Information Not Subject to Protection
Any information, whether tangible 16 or intangible, 17 is subject to
trade secret protection. Information that is in the public domain, 18 published,19 patented, 20 otherwise disclosed, 21 obvious, 22 based on common
1.

13. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS§ 757 comment b (1939). This section was intentionally
omitted in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, because the American Law Institute
determined that trade secret law had developed independently from tort law. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Introductory Note to Division Nine (1979).
14. The elements of a trade secret are confidentiality and secrecy. RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 757 comment b, at 6-7 (1939).
15. "[T]he protection [accorded under trade secret lawl is against the tactics rather than
against the use of the secret as such." 2 R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 14.01, at 3 (4th ed. 1982 & Supp.
1989); see also 12A R. MILGRIM, supra note 12, at§ 7.03[2].
16. Tangible information consists of items such as customer lists, formulas and magnetic media. See generally 2 R. CALLMAN, supra note 15, § 14.10; 12 R. MILGRIM,
supra note 12, §§ 2.09[6], [7].
17. Intangible information refers to subject matter such as a plan, combination of steps,
an idea or general know-how. See, e.g., Space Aero Prod. Co. v. R.E. Darling Co.,
238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74 (thirty step process consisting of simple manual operations
to construct oxygen breathing hose held to be a trade secret), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
843 (1965). But see McKay v. Communispond, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 801, 807
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (teaching technique held not protectable because the "defendant
cannot enjoin plaintiff from using 'intangible procedures and techniques that [plaintiff] learned while [he was] employed by [defendant].'") (citation omitted). See generally 2 R. CALLMAN, supra note 15, § 14.06 ("Almost any subject matter may be
claimed to be a trade secret.").
18. The "public domain" is a term of art which describes any information that the
public has a right to use without paying compensation to the person who disclosed,
developed or provided the information. See generally Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 109 S.Ct. 971, 980 (1989) ("both the novelty and nonobviousness
requirements of federal patent law are grounded in the notion that concepts within
the public grasp, or those so obvious that they readily could be, are the tools of
creation for all."); Cummings, Some Aspects of Trade Secrets and Their Protection:
The Public Domain and the "Unified Description" Requirement, 54 KY. L.J. 190,
192-94 ( 1965).
19. See, e.g., CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842 (lst Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1016 (1986) (disclosure of chemical process in government reports constituted
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sense, 23 common knowledge, 24 or general knowledge,2 5 however, is not
the proper subject of trade secret protection.
Because there is no federal trade secret law, the determination of
whether information is subject to protection is made according to the
relevant state law in federal diversity and pendent/ancillary actions. 26
Some courts have decided that whether information is subject to protection is a question of law,2 7 but in other jurisdictions it may be a question
of fact. 28
2.

Secrecy and Confidence

Secrecy and confidence exist over information if the employer demonstrates an intention to keep information secret, 29 the employee is aware
of the employer's intention 30 and some "confidential relationship" 31 is

20.
21.

22.

23.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

29.
30.
31.

a publication). If part of the disclosure occurs in one medium (e.g., written public
reports), and other disclosures occur in another medium (e.g., in a speech), an issue
arises as to whether the "unified" disclosures constitute publication of the technology. See generally Cummings, supra note 18, at 197-201 (concluding that if the user
of information has in good faith kept up to date in the relevant art and could construct the technology by aggregating disclosures, the acquisition of information
should be considered "by fair means" - regardless of whether the user had actual
knowledge of all of the disclosures).
See 2 R. CALLMAN, supra note 15, § 14.14, at 63; 12 R. MILGRIM, supra note 12,
§ 2.06.
Information that is otherwise disclosed includes information disclosed in a deposition or in litigation. But cf Plastic & Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Roy, 163 Conn.
257, 303 A.2d 725 (1972) (s~cret disclosed in exhibit to complaint but record sealed
prior to general public access held not to be a publication).
A patent must be unobvious, but "a trade secret need not be essentially novel or
unobvious." 2 R. CALLMAN, supra note 15, § 14.07; accord 12 R. MILGRIM, supra
note 12, § 2.08[2]. Something so obvious as to be commonly known, however, is
neither patentable nor protectable as a trade secret. Bonito Boats, 109 S.Ct. at 980.
An invention that is patentable is per se protectable as a trade secret prior to disclosure. 12 R. MILGRIM, supra note 12, § 2.08[1].
Common sense information, for example, may consist of a procedure which maximizes profits and minimizes costs. Cf Tabs Assoc. v. Brohawn, 59 Md. App. 330,
475 A.2d 1203 (1984) (defendants argued that mail sorting process selecting highest
zip-code density was common sense).
2 R. CALLMAN, supra note 15, § 14.07.
/d. § 14.24.
/d. § 14.01.
See, e.g., Operations Research, Inc. v. Davidson & Talbird, Inc., 241 Md. 550, 556,
217 A.2d 375, 379 (1966).
See, e.g., Sheets v. Yamaha Motors Corp., 849 F.2d 179, 183 (5th Cir. 1988) (determination of whether there was reasonable secrecy is a question of fact); Porter Indus., Inc. v. Higgins, 680 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Colo. App. 1984). The distinction is
important because it affects trial strategy (e.g., jury demand) as well as the standard
of review on appeal.
See 2 R. CALLMAN, supra note 15, § 14.11. The intention may be express (e.g., by
agreement or designation-"SECRET") or implied by conduct of the employer.
"[T]he plaintiff in a trade secret case must prove that the defendant [whether discloser or user] . . . was aware of [the information's] confidential nature." /d.
§ 14.03, at 14-21.
/d. Examples of protected relationships include: employer-employee, manufacturer-
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present. Although a cause of action lies for breach of confidence regarding information that is not subject to protection, it is not considered a
trade secret misappropriation. 32
3.

Misappropriation

A "misappropriation" is the acquisition of a trade secret by improper means, or its disclosure or use by a person who knows or should
know of the improper acquisition of the trade secret. 33 There is no technical misappropriation of a trade secret, however, if the discovery of information is by fair means, 34 or the employee's use of the information is
derived from "general knowledge, skill and experience [obtained] in his
former employment." 35 A misappropriation is nevertheless wrongful if it
constitutes a breach of trust between the employer and employee. 36 A
breach of trust may occur when the employee is acting for his own benefit, for the benefit of a competitor or simply out of spite. 37 The question
of whether there is a misappropriation is one of mixed law and fact. 38
4.

Effect of a Written Agreement
Generally, no written agreement is necessary to enforce a trade se-

32.

33.
34.

35.
36.

37.
38.

independent contractor, licensor-licensee, manufacturer-sales agent, supplier-purchaser, vendor-vendee of a business, director-corporation, partner-partner, joint
venturer-joint venturer. See 12 R. MILGRIM, supra note 12, §§ 5.01-.04.
See 2 R. CALLMAN, supra note 15, at 14-23 n.19 (an employee in a position of
authority may breach a confidential relationship even if the information appropriated does not technically amount to a trade secret); Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 897 nn. 4-5 (Minn. 1983). An employer's
mere expression that a disclosure is "confidential," however, may not be sufficient to
intend confidence over the underlying information. 2 R. CALLMAN, supra note 15,
§ 14.03, at 21 ("[T]here must be an express or clearly implied understanding in
respect of the confidential nature of the information") (emphasis supplied).
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (Supp. 1989); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 759 (1939).
"Information revealed by chemical analysis, physical examination [and] reverse engineering . . . does not normally qualify for protection as a trade secret." 2 R.
CALLMAN, supra note 15, § 14.13, at 14-58 to -59. Once a product is placed on the
market it "announces to the world the secret of the invention embodied in it, unless
the secret is not apparent from the article itself .... " /d. at 14-59.
/d. § 14.24; Van Prod. Co. v. General Welding & Fabricating Co., 419 Pa. 248, 213
A.2d 769 (1965); cf Padover v. Axelson, 268 Mass. 148, 167 N.E. 301 (1929).
"Anyone connected with a business ... is 'under a legal obligation not to act adversely to its interests' .... " 2 R. CALLMAN, supra note 15, § 14.22, at 79. A
breach of trust is a violation of any legal duty owed to the employer, typically the
duty of loyalty. But see Allan M. Dworkin, D.D.S., P.A. v. Blumenthal, 77 Md.
App. 774, 551 A.2d 947 (1989); Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382
A.2d 564 (1978) (no breach of duty where officer-director of company makes plans
to compete with his employer while still working).
See 2 R. CALLMAN, supra note 15, § 14.22, at 81.
Dependable Lists, Inc. v. Malek, 98 A.D.2d 679, 469 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1983); Chanay
v. Chittenden, 115 Ariz. 32, 563 P.2d 287 (1977); cf Space Aero Prod. Co. v. R.E.
Darling Co., 238 Md 93, 115-17, 208 A.2d 74, 85-86, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843
(1965).
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cret misappropriation claim. 39 In the absence of an enforceable agreement, however, an employer's injunction restraining misuse is generally
limited to the period of time that "competitors would require after public
disclosure to develop a competing machine." 40 The most frequently litigated type of agreement is an employee agreement not to compete, 41
although licensing agreements 42 and general confidentiality agreements43
also have been the subject of litigation.
In summary, a trade secret is any information which gives the employer an advantage over competitors, and which is held in reasonable
secrecy within the business. 44

B.

Trade Secret and Patent Compared

A patent is the right granted by the federal government to a patentee
to exclude others from manufacturing and using the product described in
the letters patent. 45 To obtain a patent, the prospective patentee must file
an application with the Patent and Trademark Office, disclose all rele39. See 2 R. CALLMAN, supra note 15, § 14.04; see also Tabs Assoc. v. Brohawn, 59
Md. App. 330, 341, 475 A.2d 1203, 1209 (1984); Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158
F. Supp. 919, 923 (D. Md. 1958).
40. Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 142 (9th
Cir. 1965). This period of time is generally referred to as the "reverse engineering
period." See 12A R. MILGRIM, supra note 12, § 7.08[1], at 7-261 to -265 n. 12.
Even in the absence of a written agreement, however, injunctive relief may extend
beyond the reverse engineering period. Compare Winston Research, 350 F.2d at 142
("A permanent injunction would subvert the public's interest in allowing technical
employees to make full use of their knowledge and skill and in fostering research
and development.") with Head Ski, 158 F. Supp. at 923-24 (former employees of
plaintiff were permanently enjoined both as to time and place-worldwide-from
manufacturing or advising "any person, firm or corporation as to the manufacture"
of a competing ski). See also Comment, Trade Secret Misappropriation: What is the
Proper Length of an Injunction After Public Disclosure?, 51 ALB. L. REv. 271 (1987)
(discussing Winston Research and other cases and concluding that the Winston Research rule is proper, except in cases "of particularly egregious conduct").
41. See 12 R. MILGRIM, supra note 12, § 3.05[1], at 3-149; Blake, Employee Agreements
Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 625 (1960).
42. E.g. 12 R. MILGRIM, supra note 12, § 3.05[5].
43. E.g. 12B R. MILGRIM, supra note 12, app. C; see also Reece, supra note 2, at 172.
44. A commonly used "factor" test from the Restatement is helpful in determining
whether a trade secret exists. The six factors one should consider are:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his business;
(2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in
his business;
(3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the
information;
(4) the value of the information to him and to his competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the
information; [and]
(6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly
acquired or duplicated by others.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS§ 757 comment b, at 6 (1939).
45. See generally P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS §§ 1-3, at 5-12
(1975).
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vant prior art, and convince the examiner that the invention is novel,
utilitarian and not obvious. 46 If the patent issues, the technology embodied in the product must be disclosed to the public and any trade secrets
contained within the disclosures are lost. 47 The trade-off for the public
disclosure and loss of trade secrets is the right to exclude others, including subsequent independent discoverers, from using, manufacturing or
selling the product for 17 years.
Patents differ from trade secrets in several respects: a patent has a
constitutional48 and statutory49 origin, is of limited existence, 50 requires
complete disclosure of the technology, 51 and is expressly exempt from
the antitrust laws. 52 Additionally, patent law protects only novel, unobvious and utilitarian tangible products. 53 In contrast, a trade secret is
based on principles of equity 54 and the common law, 5 5 is of theoretically
infinite duration, 56 requires secrecy as opposed to disclosure, 57 protects
intangible as well as tangible ideas and expressions, and is not specifically
exempt from the reach of antitrust laws. 58

46. See id. at 89-130, 183-89.
47. /d. at 7 ("The inventor makes a truly Faustian bargain with the sovereign, exchanging secrecy, of indefinite and of possibly perpetual duration, for ephemeral patent
rights!").
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
49. 35 u.s.c. §§ 1-376 (1982).
50. /d. § 154 (17 year duration).
51. 12 R. MtLGRIM, supra note 12, § 6.05(4][a], at 6-200.
52. /d. § 6.05(4], at 6-198 n.44. "The patent system [however] ... is not an 'exception'
to the antitrust laws, and patent rights are not legal monopolies in the antitrust sense
of the word." American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350,
1367 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
53. 35 u.s.c. §§ 101-103 (1982).
54. "(E]quity will not permit one who has come to learn the trade secret in a confidential relationship to use or disclose it to the detriment of the owner." 12 R. MILGRIM, supra note 12, § 4.03, at 4-17.
55. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
56. 12 R. MILGRIM, supra note 12, § 6.05(4][a], at 6-200.
57. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
58. 12 R. MtLGRIM, supra note 12, § 6.05. Patent law can also be distinguished from
trade secret law with respect to non-substantive matters. For example, a lawyer
must pass a separate patent bar examination to practice before the Patent & Trademark Office, and patent lawyers are subject to a separate code of professional responsibility. 37 C.F.R. § 10.7(b) (1988) (bar exam, patent law only); /d. at§§ 10.20
- 10.112. (Code of Professional Responsibility). Additionally, to acquire patent protection complicated filing, review and disclosure procedures must be met, and ultimately, the Patent & Trademark Office must approve the application. See 35 U.S.C.
§§ 112, 151-153 (I 982 & Supp. IV 1986). A patent is also presumed valid (which
shifts the burden of production); the holder of alleged trade secrets, however, enjoys
no presumption of validity. See also infra note 79 and accompanying text.
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II.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE PATENT FRAUD AND TRADE
SECRET BAD FAITH ANTITRUST CAUSES OF
ACTION

A.

Patent Fraud

In Walker Process Equipment Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical
Corp., 5 9 the Supreme Court first recognized that in certain circumstances
assertion of an invalid patent in an infringement action could violate section 2 of the Sherman Act. 60 In Walker Process, Food Machinery &
Chemical Corporation, the patentee, brought an action alleging that
Walker Process infringed its patent. During the litigation, Food Machinery moved to dismiss its complaint because its patent had expired. 61 In
response, Walker Process "amended its counterclaim to charge that
Food Machinery had 'illegally monopolized interstate and foreign commerce by fraudulently and in bad faith obtaining and maintaining ... its
patent.' " 62 Specifically, Walker Process contended that Food Machinery knew that the invention it had patented had been in public use for
more than one year prior to the filing of the patent application, 63 and
therefore that Food Machinery knew its invention was not capable of
being patented. 64
The Supreme Court held that proof of bad faith procurement and
assertion of a known unpatentable product could be a valid Sherman Act
section 2 offense, as long as other elements of the antitrust claim were
proven. 65 Justice Harlan concurred in the result, explaining that
[A] private cause of action would not be made out if the plaintiff: (1) showed no more than invalidity of the patent arising,
for example, from a judicial finding of "obviousness," or from
other factors sometimes compendiously referred to as "technical fraud"; or (2) showed fraudulent procurement, but no
59. 382 u.s. 172 (1965).
60. /d. at 177. See generally C. HAMBURG, PATENT FRAUD AND INEQUITABLE CoNDUCT §§ 3.02[4], 4.01 (1981); Kayton, Lynch & Stern, Fraud in Patent Procurement: Genuine and Sham Charges, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1974); Niro &
Wigert, Patents, Fraud and the Antitrust Laws, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 168 (1968);
Stedman, Acquisition of Patents and Know-How by Grant, Fraud, Purchase and
Grant-Back, 28 U. PITT. L. REv. 161, 172-77 (1966); Annotation, Fraud in Patent
Procurement As A Violation of§ 2 of the Sherman Act, 65 A.L.R. FED. 408 (1983).
Lower courts have held that the Walker Process doctrine also supports a cause of
action under section 1 of the Sherman Act. See Cataphote Corp. v. DeSoto Chern.
Coatings, Inc., 450 F.2d 769, 772 n.9 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 929
(1972); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 428 F.2d 555, 567 n.28
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 956 (1970).
61. Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 174.
62. !d.
63. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
64. Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 174.
65. !d. at 177. The Court rejected the argument that such a rule would subject patentees to "innumerable vexatious suits." Id. at 176. See infra notes 107-15 for the
other elements of actions under section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
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knowledge thereof by the defendant; or (3) failed to prove the
elements of a § 2 charge even though he has established actual
fraud in the procurement of the patent and the defendant's
knowledge of that fraud. 6 6
The Walker Process decision opened a new field of patent litigation, and
patent fraud has probably become one of the most often asserted counterclaims in patent infringement actions. 67
Despite the popularity of raising a Walker Process defense, most federal circuit courts have allowed antitrust liability to attach only where
the fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions are material, requiring
the challenger to prove that "but for" the fraud the patent would not
have issued. For example, in E. 1 duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley
& Co., 68 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated:
A patent procured by fraud by definition would not have issued
but for the misrepresentation or non-disclosure. The patent is
invalid as improperly issued and the patentee has illegally received exclusionary rights he would not otherwise have. In
those circumstances, as the Supreme Court held in Walker Process, the severe sanctions of the Sherman Act may be
warranted. 69
In Cataphote Corp. v. DeSoto Chemical Coatings, Inc., 70 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has similarly required clear proof of fraudulent activity, noting that:
The road to the Patent Office is so tortuous and patent litigation is usually so complex, that "knowing and willful fraud" as
66. /d. at 179 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Federal Circuit denominates this "technical
fraud" as inequitable conduct, something less than common law fraud. J.P. Stevens
& Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
822 (1985).
67. See Kayton, Lynch & Stem, supra note 60, at 6-10. Professor Kayton notes that the
inequitable conduct/fraud defense in patent cases is almost always raised because
raising it is "effortless and virtually costless," and often results in a confusion of
issues, ultimately prejudicing the judge into at least awarding attorneys fees or declaring the patent invalid on some technical ground such as obviousness or novelty.
See also Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). In Lear, the Supreme Court
rejected the licensee estoppel doctrine. /d. at 670-71. The licensee estoppel doctrine
held that a patent licensee is estopped from denying the validity of the underlying
patent. See generally Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REv. 677, 678-79 ( 1986). As a result of the decisions in
Walker Process and Lear, patent licensees that are sued for nonpayment of royalties
are also able to claim that the patent was invalid and counterclaim for antitrust
damages.
68. 620 F.2d 1247 (8th Cir. 1980).
69. /d. at 1274. But see Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 795 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (requiring
consideration of the subjective state of mind of the examiner in some cases, because
even if the invention is objectively patentable, if the examiner would not have issued
it but for the misrepresentation, the patent still might not have issued).
70. 450 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 929 (1972).
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the term is used in Walker, can mean no less than clear, convincing proof of intentional fraud involving affirmative dishonesty, "a deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme to
defraud. " 71
Under this view of Walker Process, a patent can only be invalidated when
the misrepresentation or omission to the Patent and Trademark Office
examiner is a failure to disclose prior art that anticipates the patent technology, 72 or in cases where there has been a public disclosure, sale or use
of the invention more than one year prior to the date of the patent application, providing that the patentee is aware of the invalidating acts prior
to the filing of the patent application. 73
Because the standard of proof is sufficiently onerous to protect almost all conduct except for flagrant knowing fraud, courts that require
misstatements or omissions to be material in the objective "butfor" sense
rarely find violations of the antitrust laws. Courts that require this high
standard of proof justify the result because the licensee or alleged infringer has other remedies that sufficiently encourage patentees to fully
and fairly disclose all material facts to the Patent and Trademark Office, 74 and because recognition of the antitrust cause of action necessarily
chills to some extent the desire to pursue a patent on a new invention. 75

B.

Beyond Patent Fraud -

Bad Faith and Overall Scheme Theories

Despite the restrictive holding in Cataphote, most courts have held
that antitrust liability may attach in two other closely analogous instances involving patents: bad faith assertion and "overall scheme" conduct. The cause of action for bad faith assertion of a patent was
recognized in Handgards, Inc v. Ethicon, Inc. 76 In Handgards, Ethicon
71. /d. at 772. There are several tests courts apply to determine whether omitted prior
art is material, including objective and subjective "but for" tests, the "but it may
have been" test, and the official Patent and Trademark Office test in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.56(a) (1988). See J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559-60
(Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985); American Hoist & Derrick Co.
v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362-64 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821
(1984).
72. See, e.g., Acme Precision Prods., Inc. v. American Alloys Corp., 484 F.2d 1237
(8th Cir. 1973); Mayview Corp. v. Rodstein, 385 F. Supp. 1122 (C.D. Cal. 1974); see
also Kayton, Lynch & Stern, supra note 60, at 50-53.
73. See 35 U.S.C. § l02(b) (1982); Colotronic Reinhard & Co. v. Plastic Controls, Inc.,
496 F. Supp. 259 (D. Mass. 1980), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 668 F.2d 1
(lst Cir. 1981).
74. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1982) (prevailing party may recover attorneys fees in exceptional circumstances); Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance
Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945) (inequitable conduct or bad faith may warrant application of the "unclean hands" doctrine, which precludes enforcement of a valid
patent); see generally Cantrell & Chwang, Federal Circuit's Recent Views of Inequitable Conduct, in 1987 PATENT LAW ANNUAL ch. 7 (J. Moss ed. 1988).
75. Encouraging registration is one of the primary objectives of the patent laws. See
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1979).
76. 601 F.2d 986 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1979). See generally Hoerner,
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had acquired and asserted two patents against Handgards in patent infringement actions. Ethicon voluntarily dropped one of the infringement
claims, and ultimately lost the other when the lower court found that
there was a prior public use more than one year before the filing of the
application. 77 After Ethicon had lost its infringement action, Handgards
sued for antitrust violations, initially relying on Walker Process.
The Walker Process theory was not successful because Handgards
could not prove Ethicon knew its patent was invalid when the patent
application was filed. Handgards could prove, however, that Ethicon obtained knowledge of the prior public use sometime· after acquiring the
patent, but before instigation of the lawsuit. The Ninth Circuit held that
prosecution of a patent infringement suit "in bad faith, that is, with
knowledge that the patents, though lawfully obtained, were invalid"
could constitute an antitrust violation if the plaintiff could prove the
other elements of the action, and prove actual knowledge of invalidity by
clear and convincing evidence. 78 The court also held that juries should
be instructed that infringement suits are "presumptively in good faith." 79
These heightened obstacles in antitrust cases were imposed because the
standard burden of proof in civil cases " 'might well chill' legitimate patent enforcement efforts 'because of fear of the vexations or punitive consequences of treble damage suits.' " 80

77.
78.
79.

80.

Bad Faith Enforcement of Patents-Antitrust Considerations, 55 ANTITRUST L.J.
421 (1986). This cause of action probably had its genesis in Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l
Biscuit Co., 71 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1934). In Kellogg, the court held that "[i]f a
person having no substantial claim to a trade-mark ... uses the claim in bad faith to
threaten a competitor and his customers with lawsuits ... they would seem to be
steps in an attempt to obtain a monopoly." /d. at 665-66.
See Ethicon, Inc. v. Handgards, Inc., 432 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 929 (1971).
Handgards, 601 F.2d at 993-96.
/d. at 996. The code only explicitly provides a presumption of patent validity, not a
presumption that infringement actions are in good faith. See 35 U.S.C. § 282
(1982); Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 810 (1986) (presumption
of patent validity is only overcome by clear and convincing evidence). Because patentees may have to litigate to establish validity of their patents, however, it is consistent to require the higher standard in infringement actions to effectuate Congress'
purposes in encouraging inventors to protect their property with a letter patent
rather than by relying on trade secret protection.
Handgards, 601 F.2d at 996 (quoting Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 180 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
Handgards has been accepted by the Federal Circuit in a case where the court
was applying the law of the Seventh Circuit. See Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd.,
781 F.2d 861, 875-78 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In Loctite, the cross-appellant argued that
the clear and convincing burden of proof required by Handgards was a result of the
statutory presumption of patent validity mandated by 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1982). The
presumption of validity did not apply in Loctite because the antitrust claim was
based on bad faith assertion of infringement, i.e. filing the infringement action with
knowledge that there was no infringement.
The court held that the rule in Handgards was primarily based on the public
policy "of erecting a barrier against thwarting patentees from asserting legitimate
patent rights." /d. at 877. Therefore, with respect to assertion of patent rights in an
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The "overall scheme" cause of action was recognized in Kobe, Inc.
v. Dempsey Pump Co. 81 In Kobe, the defendants had acquired substantially all of the patents relating to a hydraulic oil pump, primarily by
buying them up from inventors, corporations and patentees. 82 After
Dempsey began selling a competing pump, the defendants filed suit and
told their customers that they had begun an infringement action against
Dempsey. 83 This latter action brought Dempsey sales to a standstill.
Dempsey sued for damages claiming that the conduct of buying up all
the patents in part of a line of commerce was an unlawful monopolistic
practice.
Although noting "that Kobe did not institute the infringement action in bad faith but believed that some of its patents were infringed," 84
the Tenth Circuit nonetheless affirmed the lower court's ruling that the
defendants had monopolized a part of commerce by buying up and filing
suits to protect all the patents relating to the hydraulic oil pump. 85 In
discussing whether the bringing of the infringement action constituted an
unlawful monopolistic practice, the court said:
We have no doubt that if there was nothing more than the
bringing of the infringement action, resulting damages could
not be recovered, but that is not the case. The facts ... support
a finding that although Kobe believed some of its patents were
infringed, the real purpose of the infringement action and the
incidental activities of Kobe's representatives was to further the
existing monopoly and to eliminate Dempsey as a competitor.
The infringement action and the related activities, of course, in
themselves were not unlawful, and standing alone would not be
sufficient to sustain a claim for damages which they may have
caused, but when considered with the entire monopolistic
scheme which preceded them ... may be considered as having
been done to give effect to the unlawful scheme. 86

81.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

infringement action, there is a "presumption that the patentee has a good faith belief
in infringement." /d.
198 F.2d 416 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952); see also Grip-Pak, Inc. v.
Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466,470-73 (7th Cir. 1982) (rejecting the proposition that "a non-malicious lawsuit can never violate antitrust law"), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 958 (1983). See generally Hoerner, Patent Misuse, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 641
(1984).
Kobe, 198 F.2d at 419-21. Ownership of the patents, including some that had expired, were advertised extensively in the trade.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 424.
Jd. at 422-25.
/d. at 425 (emphasis added). The court met the contention that this rule would
impede access to the courts with the following admonition:
We fully recognize that free and unrestricted access to the courts should
not be denied or imperiled in any manner. At the same time we must not
permit the courts to be a vehicle for maintaining and carrying out an unlawful monopoly which has for its purpose the elimination and prevention
of competition.
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In summary, there are three distinct antitrust theories of recovery
for improper prosecution of patent cases. First, if the patent is acquired
by fraud on the Patent and Trademark Office, the patentee is liable for
antitrust damages caused by the filing of an infringement action, because
the patentee is asserting rights it should not have. This liability is limited
to deliberate withholding of relevant and material prior art, or a knowing
withholding of a prior public use or sale more than one year before the
filing of the patent application. Liability does not attach, however, if the
patent is declared invalid for obviousness or lack of sufficient novelty
because it is impossible to "know" a patent is invalid for either of these
reasons until a court so holds.
Secondly, if a patent was procured without fraud or other inequitable conduct, antitrust liability may attach if the patentee asserts the patent after obtaining knowledge that it is invalid (whether before or after
filing suit). This liability attaches because assertion of known invalid
rights with the purpose of destroying a competitor with litigation costs is
a predatory act under the antitrust laws. Liability under this theory,
however, has generally been limited to instances where the patentee discovers a prior public use/sale after obtaining the patent. In cases where,
for example, the patentee has obtained a legally valid patent by "inequitable conduct," a court would not likely impose antitrust liability for assertion of the patent in an infringement action prior to the finding of
inequitable conduct. 87
Finally, antitrust liability may attach in cases where, even though
the patent is validly procured and valid when asserted, the purpose in
bringing the infringement action is not to enforce the patent but rather to
destroy a competitor. 88 In this type of case, the imposition of liability is
based on the subjective purpose of the litigation irrespective of the merits
of the action.
/d. at 424.
87. See Argus Chern. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 812 F.2d 1381, 1385-86 (Fed.
Cir. 1987); Korody-Colyer Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 828 F.2d 1572, 1577-78
(Fed. Cir. 1987). Argus supports the view that the clear and convincing standard of
proof coupled with the requirement of subjective "knowledge" of an invalidating
fact or facts probably prohibits imposition of antitrust damages in instances where
the "knowledge" required is a question of law, such as whether the patentee engaged
in inequitable conduct.
88. Courts have not clearly decided whether the person asserting an antitrust claim
must prove that the purpose of bringing the action had the "sole," "substantial,"
"primary," or "motivating" factor of destroying a competitor. Cf Barton's Disposal Serv., Inc. v. Tiger Corp., 886 F.2d 1430, 1437 n.22 (5th Cir. 1989) ("substantially motivated by a genuine desire for government action"); Coastal States
Marketing, Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1372 (5th Cir. 1983) (intent to genuinely
influence government action must be a significant motivating factor). Kobe supports
the view that the unlawful purpose must at least be a motivating factor, but the
court probably would have required proof that the unlawful purpose was a primary
factor had the Noerr-Pennington doctrine been decided. See infra notes 120-30 and
accompanying text.
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BAD FAITH ASSERTION OF TRADE SECRETS

The Raytheon Decision

In CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon, 89 two engineers were employed by the
Raytheon Company to help develop a chemical vapor deposition (CVD)
process. The CVD process is used to develop optical lenses, primarily for
the federal government. 90 The engineers had signed agreements not to
disclose Raytheon's trade secrets when they were hired. 91
Both engineers left Raytheon to form CVD, Inc. and compete in the
CVD market. Raytheon, however, contended it had trade secrets in the
CVD process. After the engineers had retained counsel, a settlement was
reached where CVD, Inc. agreed to pay a royalty to Raytheon for the use
of the alleged trade secrets. 92
One year after the agreement had been consummated, CVD, Inc.
sued Raytheon, seeking a declaratory judgment that the agreement was
void, and requesting treble damages and attorneys fees for violation of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. CVD proved that Raytheon had
published schematics in government reports, and that its employees had
given speeches and seminars regarding the furnaces used in the CVD
process. As a result of these disclosures, CVD, Inc. contended that the
CVD process was in the public domain, and that Raytheon knew the
CVD process was not protectable as a trade secret. 93
Presented with no direct authority, the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit held that "the threat of unfounded trade secrets litigation in
bad faith is sufficient to constitute a cause of action under the antitrust
laws .... " 94 By analogizing cases in the bad faith patent assertion area,
the court also required proof of knowledge that no trade secrets existed
by clear and convincing evidence. 95 Damages were based solely on the
legal fees incurred in the original settlement negotiation that resulted in
the licensing agreement. 96
Although accepting the jury's finding that Raytheon knew it had no
trade secrets in the CVD process, 97 the court did not rely solely on Ray89. 769 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
90. CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 848 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1016 (1986).
91. /d. at 847.
92. Id. at 848.
93. Id. at 852.
94. /d. at 851 (emphasis supplied). The court cited A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968) for the proposition that bad faith conduct in
asserting a trade secret misappropriation constituted a cause of action under the
antitrust laws. In A. & E Plastik Pak, the issue before the court was whether the
lower court abused its discretion in enforcing an arbitration clause with respect to
whether trade secrets existed. See A. & E. Plastik Pak, 396 F.2d at 714. Therefore,
A. & E. Plastik Pak does not directly support a cause of action for bad faith assertion of trade secrets.
95. Raytheon, 769 F.2d at 849. See also supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
96. /d. at 858.
97. /d. at 852. An expert testified that a competent engineer skilled in the art of chemi-
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theon's public disclosures to accept the jury's finding that no trade
secrets existed in the CVD technology. Rather, the fact that Raytheon
failed to follow its policy of stamping confidential documents "SECRET," its failure to maintain the documents in a protected drawer, its
flat insistence on high royalty percentages, and its attorneys' failure to
investigate CVD, Inc.'s claim that the CVD process was not a trade secret were all held relevant to both Raytheon's bad faith and the existence
of trade secrets. 98

B.

Elements of the Cause of Action

The Raytheon court's definition of bad faith is similar to that developed in Walker Process, Handgards and their progeny: "that the defendant asserted trade secrets with knowledge that no trade secrets
existed. " 99 Under this formulation of the cause of action, the plaintiff
must prove:
1)
2)
3)
1.

that no trade secrets existed;
that the defendant subjectively knew no trade secrets existed; 100 and
that the other elements of an antitrust action are satisfied.

Proof that No Trade Secrets Existed

Finding that no trade secrets existed is the predicate finding to any
further analysis in a Raytheon-type case. If trade secrets exist at the time
they are asserted, the theory of relief would be based on the Kobe case
and its progeny, 101 not Raytheon. As discussed above, in a Kobe-type
case, the critical element of proof is the unlawful motive in asserting
otherwise valid legal rights. Unless patent rights are involved, proof of
unlawful intent in ordinary antitrust cases is only required by a preponderance of the evidence. Under Raytheon, however, the critical element
is proof of knowledge that no trade secrets existed, and the burden of
proof on that element is by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore,
determination of whether trade secrets existed is important both to the
type of evidence required and the burden of persuasion.

98.
99.
100.

101.

cal vapor deposition could have constructed a furnace similar to Raytheon's based
on the information that was publicly available.
Id. at 853-54.
Id. at 851. This is a subjective standard.
The Raytheon court held that this element of the cause of action must be proved by
the heightened "clear and convincing" burden of persuasion. Raytheon, 769 F.2d at
851. The other elements- proof of non-existence of trade secrets and the elements
required by the antitrust laws - must only be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence.
See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
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Proof that the Defendant Subjectively Knew No Trade Secrets
Existed

Once the predicate finding is made that the information is not capable of trade secret protection, the plaintiff must also prove th~t the defendant actually knew that no trade secrets existed by clear and
convincing evidence. 102 This is a question of fact because it requires a
finding that the defendant subjectively knew it had no trade secrets. The
knowledge of non-existence may be proven at the time of the plaintiff's
creation of the information, when the plaintiff asserts the cause of action,
or after a judicial finding is made in the case that no trade secrets exist.
Such a finding requires proof that the business' attorneys knew or should
have known that there was no reasonable legal basis on which to assert a
trade secret action.I03
In Raytheon, the jury found that no trade secrets existed in the CVD
technology and that Raytheon knew no trade secrets existed. 104 In some
jurisdictions, however, the determination that no trade secrets existed is
decided by the court. 105 Nevertheless, in those jurisdictions, the question
of whether the business knew no trade secrets existed is a question of fact
for the jury that must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
This fact/law dichotomy is significant for two reasons. First, the
Raytheon rule inhibits summary dispositions of a case in jurisdictions
which hold that the determination of a trade secret is a question of fact,
because credibility issues will typically arise when determining whether a
trade secret exists. Therefore, time consuming and expensive litigation is
wasted if, for instance, the jury determines that trade secrets did exist. 106
Second, if the existence of a trade secret is a question of law, it will
be difficult for the judge to determine that the defendant had actual
knowledge that no trade secret existed. For example, the business can
102. Raytheon, 769 F.2d at 851. The court required proof of knowledge that no trade
secrets existed by clear and convincing evidence based on analogy to the justifications asserted in the patent cases - viz. to "prevent a frustration of the patent laws"
and to "ensure[] the free access to the courts." !d. at 850. In fact, trade secrets
were once thought to be preempted by the patent laws. See Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,474 (1979). Therefore, merely because both patent and
trade secret law "encourage invention ... and provide innovators with protection
for the fruits of their labors" is no justification for the heightened burden of persuasion in antitrust analysis vis-a-vis bad faith assertion of trade secrets. Furthermore,
patent law expressly provides for presumption of patent validity, which courts rely
on to require the clear and convincing burden in patent bad faith cases. See supra
note 78 and accompanying text. The heightened burden of persuasion in bad faith
trade secret cases, however, may nevertheless be compelled by the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. See infra note 130.
103. Cf In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1985).
104. Raytheon, 769 F.2d at 852-54.
105. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
106. See Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 108 Wash. 2d 38, 73,8 P.2d 665 (1987) (court
reversed a jury that awarded damages on a counterclaim for state antitrust law violations where the jury had also awarded damages to the plaintiff for misappropriation of confidential information).
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argue that because the existence of a trade secret is a question of law, it
cannot know by clear and convincing evidence that no trade see;ret existed absent a judicial finding. In these jurisdictions, Raytheon-type cases
will be hard to prove and be less of a deterrent on monopolistic conduct.
The question of law formulation, however, promotes judicial economy,
because the issue of existence of trade secrets can be determined summarily prior to a lengthy trial.
3.

Other Elements of an Antitrust Action

In addition to establishing that no trade secret existed and that the
defendant had actual knowledge that no trade secret existed, under section 1 of the Sherman Act 107 the plaintiff must also prove a contract,
combination or conspiracy, 108 specific intent to restrain competition, 109
and antitrust injury.uo To prove a section 2 111 violation, the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant had specific intent 112 to monopolize the
107. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ... is declared to be
illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
108. Conduct amounting to a contract, combination or conspiracy requires a plurality of
actors and concerted action. See 2 VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND
TRADE REGULATION§ 6.01(1], at 6-5 to -6 (1969 & Supp. 1989); see generally Pearl
Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 945, 950-51 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
109. Proof of intent may be inferred from an anti-competitive effect or shown by proof of
unlawful purpose. See McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S.
232, 243 (1980). The restraint on competition must also concern activities "in commerce" or that "affect" commerce. /d. at 242. Finally, the restraint on competition
must be "unreasonable." See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S.
332, 343 (1982). The Supreme Court has noted that it will use either a "rule of
reason" or per se approach in determining the reasonableness of any contract, combination or conspiracy. /d. at 343-44. These two approaches of interpreting the
Sherman Act are discussed infra at notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
110. Antitrust injury results when there is a violation, and the resulting injury is "of a
type that Congress sought to redress in providing a private remedy for violations of
the antitrust laws." Association of Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983) (citing Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982)). The Court has found it useful to apply by analogy
the common law proximate cause doctrine, which has made this determination
complicated. /d. at 535-36. Some courts refer to this requirement as "standing."
See Transource Int'l, Inc. v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 725 F.2d 274, 280-81 (5th Cir.
1984).
111. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part: "Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
states ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... " 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
112. There are two types of section 2 violations: monopolization and attempts to monopolize. In a monopolization claim, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had
market power in the relevant market and that the defendant willfully acquired or
maintained that power. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71
(1966); Supermarket of Homes v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors, 786 F.2d
1400, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1986). The attempt claim requires "specific intent to control prices or to destroy competition, predatory or anticompetitive conduct directed
to accomplishing that end, [and] a dangerous probability of success." Supermarket
of Homes, 786 F.2d at 1405; see also Neumann v. Reinforced Earth Co., 786 F.2d
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relevant market, 113 market power in the relevant market, 114 and in "attempt" cases, that the defendant had a "dangerous probability of success."115 In a section 2 case there is no requirement to prove a "contract,
combination or conspiracy."
In Raytheon, the licensing agreement was the contract, and the licensing agreement's extraction from CVD, Inc. was the act which constituted the violation. 116 Therefore, the court inferred a specific intent to
monopolize and restrain trade from the presence of bad faith in claiming
that the CVD technology was a trade secret. 117 The other elements of
the antitrust violations were satisfied. 118 Although it is not clear from
the opinion, Raytheon apparently violated both section 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. 119
IV.

A.

NOERR-PENNINGTON LIMITS ON LIABILITY
General Principles
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine developed in Eastern Railroad Presi-

113.

114.

115.
116.
117.

118.

119.

424,426-27 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 851 (1986). The question of intent is
relevant to both offenses, although used for different purposes. See Aspen Skiing
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602-03 (1985) (the attempt
action requires "an intent which goes beyond the mere intent to do the act," but in
the monopolization action intent is only relevant to characterizing conduct as "exclusionary," "anticompetitive," or "predatory").
"The relevant market is the market in which an entity's power is measured to determine whether the entity is a monopolist for antitrust law purposes. The relevant
market is generally defined in both geographic and product terms." Southern Pac.
Communications Co. v. AT&T, 740 F.2d 1011, 1014 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citations
omitted); see also Oltz v. St. Peters Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1446 (9th
Cir. 1988).
"Market power [sometimes referred to as monopoly power] is the ability to raise
prices above those that would be charged in a competitive market." NCAA v.
Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984) (holding that
the NCAA has market power to control TV advertisers' access to college football
game air times).
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905); 3 VoN KALINOWSKI, supra
note 107, § 9.01[2].
CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 851 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1016 (1986).
/d. Other courts have so held in the patent bad faith line of cases. See, e.g., Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 1293 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1190 (1985). The court in Raytheon upheld both intent requirements under
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, because Raytheon was monopolizing the relevant market, not merely making an "attempted" monopolization.
Raytheon was the only producer of ZnSe and Zns via the CVD process in the world.
Raytheon, 769 F.2d at 851. Raytheon therefore had market power. The injurycausation element was no barrier to recovery because the licensing agreement had
an adverse economic affect on CVD, Inc. /d. at 858. The court, however, went on
to state that "[s]ince Raytheon asserted its claim in bad faith, with the intent to
restrain competition, it is the type of offense the antitrust laws are designed to prevent." /d. Therefore, in bad faith cases, the "antitrust injury" requirement is met
by proof of the unlawful intent.
Raytheon, 769 F.2d at 851,860.
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dents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. 120 and United Mine Workers v. Pennington. 121 The doctrine prohibits a court from imposing
antitrust liability for certain activities that have an anticompetitive motive (or result), because the conduct is protected under the constitution.
For example, in Noerr, the Supreme Court held that attempts to influence a legislative or executive body by lobbying would be protected by
the first amendment right to petition. 122 In Pennington, the Court held
that Noerr applied to administrative agencies, and expanded the scope of
protection to encompass "a concerted effort to influence public officials
regardless of intent or purpose." 123 In California Motor Transportation
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 124 the doctrine was extended to include petitions to the judicial branch of government. 12 s
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine, however, has an important exception - the so-called "sham" petition. A sham petition is a suit filed with
the purpose of restraining trade or maintaining a monopoly, and consequently, is not protected from the reach of the antitrust laws. 126 The
current formulation of a sham petition requires proof of either an unreasonable prospect of success on the merits, or a finding that the suit was
"brought only because of the costs of litigation impose[d] on the other
party."127
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is applicable when a party asserts
rights in court in "good faith." 128 Therefore, in Walker Process and
120. 365 u.s. 127 (1961).
121. 381 U.S. 657 (1965). Neither opinion was mentioned in Walker Process. See generally Hurwitz, Abuse of Governmental Processes, the First Amendment, and the
Boundaries of Noerr, 74 GEORGETOWN L.J. 65 (1985); Fischel, Antitrust Liability
for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis and Limits of the NoerrPennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 80 (1977).
122. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137-38.
123. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670 (emphasis added).
124. 404 u.s. 508 (1972).
125. /d. at 510.
126. See California Motor, 404 U.S. at 512-14. See generally Note, Noerr-Pennington
Immunity from Antitrust Liability under Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor
Tariff Bureau, Inc.: Replacing the Sham Exception with a Constitutional Analysis,
69 CORNELL L. REV. 1305 (1984). California Motor, which more firmly established this exception, is somewhat at odds with the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in
this respect. See California Motor, 404 U.S. at 516-18 (Stewart J., concurring) (arguing that in broadening the scope of the sham exception the court "in the process
tramples upon important First Amendment values"). See generally Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 674 F.2d 1252, 1265 n.21 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983); Potters Medical Center v. City Hosp.
Ass'n, 800 F.2d 568, 577-78 (6th Cir. 1986) (basing a holding of no sham petition on
the finding that the defendant's position prevailed).
127. Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, Inc., 814 F.2d 358,
372 (7th Cir. 1987).
128. See Barton's Disposal Serv., Inc. v. Tiger Corp., 886 F.2d 1430, 1432 (5th Cir. 1989)
(interrogatory number 6); Rickards v. Canine Eye Registration Found., Inc., 783
F.2d 1329, 1334-35 (9th Cir.) (finding that costs of litigating a frivolous claim constituted antitrust injury), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 851 (1986); Winterland Concessions
Co. v. Trela, 735 F.2d 257, 263 (7th Cir. 1984).

564

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 18

Handgards claims, most courts hold that Noerr-Pennington is not a bar
to the antitrust action because a showing of bad faith is required. 129 In
Kobe- type claims, however, the antitrust action is based on proof of unlawful intent, not on proof of assertion of known invalid rights. In these
cases, therefore, Noerr-Pennington is a defense, unless it can be shown by
the person claiming an antitrust violation that the "primary" purpose in
bringing the suit was not to enforce substantive rights, but rather to destroy a competitor. 130
B.

Application of Noerr-Pennington to Raytheon-type Claims

Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, if knowledge that no trade
secret exists is equated with bad faith, the sham exception is prima facie
met. 131 Accordingly, a factual finding of actual knowledge that no trade
secrets existed will generally vitiate the Noerr-Pennington defense to the
antitrust action. The prerequisites of the sham exception to the NoerrPennington doctrine have, however, eluded the courts and commentators
for some time. Thus, some courts have required multiple claims for relief
before invoking the sham exception, 132 while other courts have defined
the standard as litigation brought "without [a] reasonable prospect of
success." 133
As an example, the Raytheon court required proof of knowledge
that no trade secrets existed and "some other evidence" of bad faith. 134
It is unclear, however, whether mere proof of knowledge that no trade
secrets existed will constitute a "sham" within the meaning of the NoerrPennington doctrine. Similarly, under a Kobe theory, where valid trade
secret rights are asserted primarily for the purpose of monopolizing a
market, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine will apply and bar antitrust liability absent proof that the suit was brought only because of the costs of
129. Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d I-54, 161 (3d Cir. 1984)
(copyright); MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Litton Systems, Inc. v. AT&T Co., 700 F.2d 785,
812-13 (2d Cir. 1983) (instructions on good faith/bad faith dichotomy upheld);
Coastal States Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1372 (5th Cir. 1983).
130. Fischel, supra note 121, at 112-13 (Kobe doctrine is of "doubtful validity" in light of
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine). Noerr-Pennington does not require proof that the
monopolistic result be the "sole" purpose in bringing the suit, because it can always
be proven that one purpose in bringing a bona-fide claim is to recover and execute
on a judgment, even if the decision is uneconomical. Cf Barton's Disposal Serv.,
Inc. v. Tiger Corp., 886 F.2d 1430, 1437 n.22 (5th Cir. 1989) ("substantially motivated by a genuine desire for government action").
131. Raytheon, 769 F.2d at 851.
132. See Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 674 F.2d 1252,
1266 n.24 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983); Huron Valley Hosp.,
Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301, 1313-15 (E.D. Mich. 1979), vacated on
other grounds, 666 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1981).
133. Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358, 372
(7th Cir. 1987); see also Village of Bolingbrook v. Citizens Uti!. Co. of Ill., 864 F.2d
481, 483 (7th Cir. 1988).
134. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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litigation imposed on the other party.t3s
V.

OTHER FORMULATIONS OF BAD FAITH

The Raytheon court established one formulation of bad faith: assertion of a trade secret misappropriation claim with knowledge that the
information has been published and is in the public domain. 136 Several
other formulations of bad faith, however, could exist and could provide a
basis for an antitrust action. For example, bad faith could be established
if the employer knew or should have known that one of the elements of a
trade secret did not exist. 137 This formulation, however, is subject to
substantial constitutional challenges.t3s
Another formulation of bad faith could be justified on conduct surrounding the efforts of the employer in asserting the misappropriation
claim. 139 Even if this conduct tends to show bad faith, however, the underlying information must not otherwise meet the elements of a trade
secret. 140
Finally, bad faith could exist when an employer asserts a claim with
135. See Central Telecommunications v. TCI Cablevision, Inc .. 800 F.2d 711, 720-21
n.lO (8th Cir. 1986); Westmac, Inc. v. Smith, 797 F.2d 313, 315-17 (6th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1035 (1987); Neumann v. Reinforced Earth Co., 786 F.2d
424, 426-27 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 851 (1986); accord Fischel, supra note
121, at 112-13.
136. A related basis would be a trade secret suit brought on the information or "claims"
which are the subject of an invalid patent. As explained above, upon the grant of
letters patent, the information embodied in the claims enters the public domain,
regardless of whether the patent is invalid. See supra note 47. Therefore, if a patent
is declared unenforceable for "inequitable conduct," a subsequent suit for trade secret misappropriation would violate the antitrust laws if the other elements of the
action were proven.
137. The common law elements of a trade secret are secrecy and confidentiality. See
supra note 14. If a person knows that the information asserted to be a trade secret
was not maintained in reasonable secrecy, its assertion would constitute bad faith
litigation. A claim for misappropriation of trade secret asserted with knowledge
that the defendant did not use improper means (or obtained the information by fair
means) would also constitute bad faith litigation.
138. Whether information was maintained in reasonable secrecy within the business, and
whether "improper means" were used to obtain the information are mixed questions
of fact and law. Therefore, it should be only a small burden for the employer to
show that he or she had a good faith or genuine belief in the elements of the action
sufficient to invoke the protections of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Cf. supra note
87 (inequitable conduct does not give rise to antitrust liability).
139. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
140. If information is protectable, bad faith conduct in securing rights under law is not a
defense for the employee in a trade secret misappropriation suit. See supra note 101
and accompanying text (establishing that no trade secrets exist is the predicate finding to a Raytheon-type case). If the bad faith conduct vexatiously multiplies the
proceedings, the employee may obtain attorneys fees. See supra note 8. If the bad
faith conduct, however, is coupled with an intent to drive the employee out of a
potential market, and the employer is attempting to enforce an overbroad restrictive
covenant, is a monopolist, or is attempting to monopolize a market, the employer
may be liable under state or federal antitrust laws. The result depends on whether
the employee can prove by clear and convincing evidence that the employer was not
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knowledge of a prior judicial determination adverse to its position in the
second suit. 141 This formulation would not run afoul of constitutional
challenges. 142 The complex requirements of asserting collateral estoppel,
however, might provide some practical problems. 143
The employer will invariably have a Noerr-Pennington defense regardless of the theory used to prove bad faith. In fact, presence of the
Noerr-Pennington defense led one commentator to conclude that an antitrust cause of action is an insufficient curb on anticompetitive practices.144 That view, however, places undue weight on the first
amendment's interplay with commercial ethics. Although the conflict
between an employer's right to access the courts and the employee's right
to freedom from vexatious litigation is not easily resolved, 145 in a true
case of bad faith assertion of trade secret the balance is struck easily . 146

141.

142.
143.

144.
145.

146.

substantially motivated by a genuine good faith desire to enforce his trade secret
rights, sufficient to invoke the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
The employee would assert res judicata or collateral estoppel as to the new suit,
contending that the prior judicial determination bars the employer from re-adjudicating the non-existence of a trade secret. Res judicata bars a second suit when
there has been a judgment on the merits between the same parties or their privies on
the same cause of action in a prior case. E.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979). Collateral estoppel prevents relitigation in a subsequent
suit of the same issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome in the prior
case. /d. Some jurisdictions require mutuality of parties in collateral estoppel cases,
but due process only requires a "full and fair" opportunity to litigate. /d. at 332.
(offensive use of collateral estoppel is permissible in some cases). But see United
States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984) (limiting offensive use of collateral estoppel
to private litigants). Since it is unlikely that an employer would assert the same
cause of action against the same employee after a final judgment, collateral estoppel
is the most probable weapon in the employee's arsenal.
None of the policy reasons behind the Noerr-Pennington doctrine exist after a full
and fair hearing on the merits. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not authorize
collateral attacks on prior judgments.
For instance, after a prior determination, the employer may take steps to increase
secrecy, improve the product or redraft its agreements with employees. If the facts
underlying the previous suit are not substantially similar, a court might not invoke
the collateral estoppel doctrine. Furthermore, an employer who is sued by employees at different times could argue that offensive use of collateral estoppel is inappropriate if in the prior suit there was little incentive to vigorously defend the prior
claim. See, e.g., Otherson v. I.N.S., 711 F.2d 267 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (lack of incentive
to litigate may be raised in some cases even if the issue was raised in a prior suit).
See Smith, supra note 5, at 1118-21.
Cf Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, Inc., 814 F.2d
358, 371-76 (7th Cir. 1987) (extensively reviewing the Noerr-Pennington "sham"
exception doctrine). The current standard is "that a suit brought in bad faith for the
purpose of obstruction, and without reasonable prospect of success, would be a
'sham' .... " /d. at 372 (Easterbrook, J.). Also "a suit brought only because of the
costs litigation imposes on the other party also may fit the "sham" exception." /d.
Proving "bad faith" will automatically equate to a "sham" exception to the NoerrPennington doctrine. However, this does not completely address the petition repetition dichotomy that some courts use as a touchstone to invocation of the exception. See Smith, supra note 5, at 1119 n.146.
See, e.g., Premier Elec., 814 F.2d at 372-73; CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d
842, 850-51 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190 (1985).
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PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

If an employer does not impose a contract, covenant not to compete,
or licensing agreement, a Raytheon-type case cannot be maintained under
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 147 Furthermore, a Raytheon case cannot
be maintained unless the employer and the former employee, or his new
employer, are "in competition." 148 Therefore, an employer is more likely
to be able to assert a trade secret misappropriation claim free of antitrust
considerations if there is no "contract, combination or conspiracy," as
long as the employer does not have monopoly power or sufficient market
share to have a dangerous probability of obtaining monopoly power.
The most common agreements that fall within the purview of antitrust laws are covenants not to compete. 149 Federal courts have accepted
a "rule of reason" analysis in this area. 150 The rule of reason was devel147. Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires a "contract, combination or conspiracy"
before a cause of action under the statute can be established. An at-will employee
that leaves and begins competition with the employer could not counter-claim with
a Raytheon argument based on section I if the employer subsequently brought a
trade secret misappropriation suit. There would be no contract in restraint of trade,
and the employer's unilateral act would not be a combination or conspiracy. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984). A possible
counterclaim under section 2 of the Sherman Act, however, may exist because unilateral action can constitute an attempted monopolization. /d.
148. The requirement that plaintiff and defendant be "in competition" is implied under
the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 500-01
(1940).
149. See Blake, supra note 41, at 628 n.6.
150. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689
(1978) (dictum) (citing Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347
(1711)); Transource Int'l v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 725 F.2d 274, 280 (5th Cir. 1984);
Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 265 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 921 (1982) (covenant upheld); Newburger Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d
1057, 1082 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978) (covenant in partnership agreement upheld); United States Football League v. NFL, 634 F. Supp. 1155,
1187-88 (S.D.N. Y. 1986) (referee contract prohibiting off-season officiating upheld).
If the alleged conduct involves boycotting, price-fixing, division of markets, resale
price maintenance or tying arrangements, courts hold that the practice is "per se"
unreasonable and therefore in restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act,
because such practices are presumed to have a pernicious effect on competition. See
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The Supreme Court's
recent analysis in this area has firmly established "that there is a presumption in
favor of a rule-of-reason standard; [and] that departure from that standard must be
justified by demonstrable economic effect .... " Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec.
Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515, 1520 (1988).
Some cases have held that ancillary covenants not to compete should be analyzed under state law, not under federal antitrust laws. See Water Services, Inc. v.
Tesco Chern., Inc., 410 F.2d 163, 167 n.4 (5th Cir. 1969). An ancillary restraint is a
covenant not to compete which is part of a valid underlying contract such as an
employment agreement or a contract for the sale of a business. /d. Non-ancillary
horizontal restraints are covenants not to compete which are typically entered into
to divide a market, fix prices, or buy out potential competitors. /d. Non-ancillary
horizontal restraints are per se illegal. See Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United
States, 334 U.S. 110, 119 (1948). Whether a covenant not to compete is ;mcillary or
non-ancillary should be relevant to the determination of whether the per se rule
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oped by the Supreme Court to analyze antitrust cases where the conduct
complained of does not constitute a per se violation of the antitrust
laws. 151 Historically, only certain practices have been considered per se
violations of the Sherman Act. 152 For example, horizontal price-fixing
agreements, certain resale price maintenance agreements, group boycotts, tying arrangements and certain horizontal market division practices may be considered per se violations of the Sherman Act. 153
There has been no holding, however, deciding whether a covenant
not to compete that satisfies a state's common law requirements would
automatically comport with the antitrust rule of reason requirements. 154
Furthermore, it is unclear whether a covenant not to compete that allegedly protects employer trade secrets could be used offensively by the former employee. The issue is whether when an employer asserts a breach
of the covenant in a state proceeding, the employee could counterclaim
for antitrust violations based on a bad faith assertion of the breach of the
covenant itself. 155 Because enforcement of a known invalid covenant not
to compete (based on knowledge that the underlying trade secrets are
invalid) is a predatory act equivalent to asserting the underlying trade
secret misappropriation with knowledge that no trade secret existed,
such a claim should be favorably entertained by the courts.
VII.

CONCLUSION
Trade secret law protects business investment in technology, and

151.
152.
153.
154.

155.

should be applied. Both types of contracts are nevertheless in restraint of trade, and
therefore there is no justification for not applying the antitrust laws only to the nonancillary covenants.
It should also be noted that vertical non-price covenants not to compete, such
as a prohibition on manufacture of the product in a distribution chain, are analyzed
under the rule of reason. See Transource Int'l v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 725 F.2d 274,
280 (5th Cir. 1984). Therefore, since covenants not to compete that protect trade
secrets are only present in ancillary contracts, whether vertical or horizontal, the
rule of reason should be applied, not the per se rule.
See E. KINTER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW§ 8.2 (1980 & Supp. 1989).
/d. at § 8.3.
/d. § 8.3, at 367-68.
Resolution of the issue depends on whether a jurisdiction that allows the blue-penciling of overbroad covenants not to compete would graft the "blue pencil theory"
into a rule of reason analysis under the antitrust law. A state that applies blue
pencil theory will fashion reasonable relief from any overbroad covenant either as to
activity, time, or area restrictions. See Blake, supra note 41, at 674-84 (1960). The
distinction between a common law reasonableness analysis and a rule of reason
analysis under antitrust law is "unclear." See Kolowrat, Stack & Lynch, supra note
10, at 748-49.
This would not be a Raytheon-type case precisely. For example, assume the employer had published its trade secret after the employee had signed his covenant not
to compete but before the employer sued him in court. The issue of when the trade
secret must exist would then be directly in issue. The probable requirement would
be that the trade secret exist at the time it is asserted in court, and not necessarily at
the time the employee signed the contract. If this were not the rule, the employer
could never claim trade secrets in after-acquired technology absent a written agreement providing expressly for such a contingency.
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promotes ethics in the workplace. Antitrust laws, on the other hand,
promote competition and are designed to protect the public from conduct that restrains free trade and artificially increases prices. By definition, these two sets of laws collide. The Raytheon decision harmonizes
them by requiring an aggrieved employee to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the employer asserted its claim with actual knowledge
that no trade secret existed and with the intent to restrain or monopolize
trade. This harmonization properly strikes a balance between the competing interests of the employer and employee. The possibility of a defecting employee asserting an antitrust action, however, complicates the
practitioner's considerations before filing suit.
The antitrust implications of the rule announced in Raytheon are a
relative newcomer to the law of trade secrets. Because antitrust concerns
are not usually contemplated when drafting the employee's contract,
when considering restrictive covenant provisions, or when suing later after the employee has left and it is suspected that trade secrets have been
disclosed to the new employer, it is important to understand and contemplate Raytheon-type concerns before giving advice on the possible ramifications of asserting trade secrets.
Between outright theft and pure predatory litigation there are many
gradations. In this area, like many others, courts will have to strive to
properly balance competing interests, and with proper standards, come
to the right result. Raytheon was correctly decided and clearly supported
by cases in other areas upholding predatory litigation as conduct
amounting to antitrust violations. However, future cases will have to
address other formulations of "bad faith," and strike some balance not
only between the litigants, but also between the cause of action asserted
by the employer and his first amendment rights of access to the courts.

Michael D. Oliver

